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Abstract 
This paper introduces the term ‘terraqueous territoriality’ to analyse a particular 
relationship between capitalism as a social formation, and the sea as a natural force. It 
focuses on three spaces – exclusive economic zones (EEZs), the system of ‘flags of 
convenience’ (FOC), and multilateral counter-piracy initiatives – as instances of 
capitalist states and firms seeking to transcend the geo-physical difference between 
firm land and fluid sea. Capital accumulation, it is argued here, seeks to territorialise 
the sea through forms of sovereignty and modes of appropriation drawn from 
experiences on land, but in doing so encounters particular tensions thereby generating 
distinctive spatial effects. By exploring the articulation between sovereignty, territory 
and appropriation in the organisation of spaces where land meets sea, the article seeks 
to demonstrate the value of an analytical framework that underlines the terraqueous 
nature of contemporary capitalism. 
 






From its inception as an historically distinctive social form in the long sixteenth-
century, capitalism has developed an ambiguous relationship with the seven tenths of 
the planet we call the sea. Present at capitalism’s foundation, principally as a trade 
route, the sea has nonetheless regularly posed geo-physical challenges to the 
expanded reproduction of capital. It has presented specific risks, created unique 
logistical difficulties and set singular geographical obstacles in the way of capitalist 
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accumulation. At the same time, the oceans have acted not just as a flat plane of 
transit – a great highway and wide common, as Alfred Thayer Mahan would have it – 
but also as a lucrative location for the extraction of natural resources and crucial 
theatre of geopolitical rivalry and domination (both in the high seas and in coastal 
waters). This ambivalence has generated particular spatial effects which we aim to 
expound in this article under the guise of ‘terraqueous territoriality’ – the distinctly 
capitalist articulation of sovereignty, territory and appropriation in the capture and 
coding of maritime space and how environmental conditions matter to these 
incursions of capital.
1
 Of course our planet has for most of its existence been 
characterised by the separation between firm land and fluid sea. Different human 
societies have from the beginning been drawn to coastal settlement where they have 
negotiated, created and changed diverse terraqueous spaces, institutions and 
cosmologies (Gillis, 2012). We consider here the historical specificity of that 
interaction under capitalism. The advent of this distinctive mode of social 
reproduction has arguably intensified the relationship between land and sea, 
especially with industrial capital’s rapid transformation of the oceans through global 
warming for instance, while the sea has facilitated the speeding up of the global 
capitalist circuit since the seventeenth century. We use the term ‘terraqueous’ to 
describe a geo-physical condition of our planet which we argue has been transformed 
and itself transforms certain organisations of space (i.e. territorialities) under 
capitalism. 
 
In what follows, we explore the tensions and contradictions inherent in capital’s 
attempt at transcending the land–sea distinction, working on the assumption that, 
while there are irreducible material properties attached to land and sea, these change 
in time and place. We are therefore necessarily addressing a socio-natural relation 
between the terrestrial and the marine which capital has sought to both channel and 
                                                 
1
 We are indebted to James Dunkerley introducing the term ‘terraqueous’ to our research in response to 
a presentation on piracy some years ago, at Queen Mary University of London. It simply means 
‘consisting of land and water’. In chapter 14 of Melville’s Moby-Dick we are told ‘two-thirds of this 
terraqueous globe are the Nantucketer’s’. We gratefully acknowledge the three peer reviewers and the 
editorial team at EPD for their thoughtful and constructive suggestions for improvements to the paper. 
We would also like to thank participants at seminars for their comments and discussion where earlier 
versions of this work were presented, including Environment and Development Studies research 
seminar, Department of Geography, Birkbeck, University of London, March 2016; School of 
Geography research seminar, Queen Mary University of London, October 2016; and the Development 
Studies Seminar Series, School of Oriental and African Studies, March 2017, where Juan Grigera acted 
as an excellent discussant. 
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overcome in different spatio-temporal contexts. It is a connection, moreover, shaped 
by both socio-political contestation and cooperation (involving state agencies, trade 
unions, companies and international organisations, among other bodies) over the 
occupation, delimitation and appropriation of oceanic resources – but rarely under 
geographical conditions of their own choosing. Plainly, various capitalist states and 
firms have engaged differently with specific seas at particular times – geopolitical, 
technological, ideological and bio-physical factors have all influenced the capitalist 
valorisation of the abstraction that is ‘the global ocean’ in complex ways. Inspired by 
pioneering work on terraqueous territorialities by, among others, Gilroy (1995), Ong 
(2006), Steinberg (2001), Steinberg and Peters (2015), Rediker and Linebaugh (2002) 
and Taussig (2000), the sea is for us emphatically a place where social relations 
interact unevenly with natural forces to generate often contingent and unexpected 
outcomes. Our starting point is the ‘territorial political economy’ perspective first 
systematically articulated in relation to the ‘ocean-space’ by Phil Steinberg (2001). 
Yet we depart from Steinberg’s ‘constructivist’ sensibilities in our emphasis upon the 
very material geo-physical attributes of the sea, which arguably make it more resistant 
than land to being transformed into a ‘second nature’, and therefore imbue our use of 
‘terraqueous territoriality’ with a degree of environmental determinism. We certainly 
acknowledge that elemental properties can be and are shaped by human intervention, 
and that they are therefore not essentially invariant. But such interventions come at a 
cost – social, environmental, monetary and political – thus revealing unequal power 
relations both within and between society and nature. In making our case, we 
concentrate in this paper on the post-war period, and consider exclusive economic 
zones (EEZs), the system of open registries (or ‘flags of convenience’), and 
multilateral counter-piracy initiatives as characteristic instances of capitalist states and 
firms seeking to transcend or sublate the geo-physical difference between firm land 
and fluid sea, thereby generating distinctive forms of terraqueous territoriality.  
 
Our three illustrations are not merely representations of hybrid or liminal spaces 
(although they are this too). They offer concrete – if always contested and therefore 
unstable – expressions of how, in encountering bio-physical challenges to its own 
reproduction at sea, capitalism has used the oceans as a laboratory to experiment with, 
and generally enforce novel combinations of sovereignty, territory and appropriation. 
Throughout, drawing on David Delaney’s (2005) suggestive formulation, we 
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emphasise the fertile interaction between ‘territoriality’ as a relation (or transitive 
verb), and ‘territory’ as a thing (or noun): the former denoting the wider range of 
strategies aimed at producing and regulating space(s), the latter referring to a more 
specific bounded space, of which the sovereign territorial state has been the dominant 
form in the modern period. The contribution is pitched principally in theoretical 
terms, building on our own and others’ original research. We draw here and there on 
elements of our own fieldwork, including by Campling on the global tuna industry 
which has involved interviewing over 600 people representing capital, states and 
labour, as well as scientists and NGOs in over a dozen countries, and Colás’ work on 
historical piracy and maritime empires.  
 
Our argument is that each of the three spaces where land meets sea highlights certain 
experimental dynamics in capitalist development and its particular relationship to the 
global ocean. These are all, to be sure, fleeting moments in the constant 
metamorphosis of capital, but they might be seen as snapshots of places where 
commodity, productive and money capital are respectively reproduced. Once again, 
there is no mechanical or static correlation here as all of these terraqueous spaces – 
the EEZ, the FOC vessel and piratical area – combine distinctive expressions of 
sovereignty, territory and appropriation (of law, politics and economics). But for 
purposes of exposition it might be helpful to think of the EEZ as a specifically 
capitalist form of appropriation (property), the FOC ship of sovereignty (jurisdiction), 
and the piratical waters, of territory (spatial governance). What we offer below is an 
analytical framework, built around concrete illustrations, which identifies some 
continuities in the fraught spatial relationship between capitalism and the sea. Before 
doing so, the next section expands briefly on the theoretical assumptions guiding our 
analysis. 
 
Capitalism and the sea: A terraqueous territoriality 
 
The sea has been a protagonist in the development of capitalism from the very 
beginning. For one school of thought – most clearly associated to the work of Fernand 
Braudel – capitalism is a world-system emerging out of maritime trade during the 
long sixteenth century (1450-1650), premised on the accumulation of mercantile 
wealth in seaports like Venice, Genoa, Amsterdam and London. This is the historical 
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moment that witnessed not just the circumnavigation of the globe, but also the 
consolidation of a world market with financial and commercial institutions which – in 
their use of words like ‘flotation’, ‘liquidity’, ‘flows’ and ‘ventures’ – invoke all the 
movement and risk of the sea. Marx’s own famous statements on the primitive or 
previous accumulation of capital underline the place of overseas conquest, the 
Atlantic slave trade and commercial wars among Europe’s naval powers in the ‘rosy 
dawn of the era of capitalist production’ (Marx, 1976: 915). Even staunch critics of 
‘neo-Smithian’ conceptions of capitalism like Robert Brenner (2001) or Ellen 
Meiksins Wood (2002) acknowledge that, although capitalist social-property relations 
may have first crystallised in the English countryside, they were subsequently 
integrated into overseas commercial networks which bolstered and nourished the 
growth of English and later, British capitalism. Brenner readily accepts that the world 
market played a significant role in stimulating demand for manufactured goods and 
staples produced under capitalist social-property relations, while Wood has no 
problem in recognising that ‘a great deal still needs to be said about how England’s 
particular insertion into the European trading system determined the development of 
English capitalism’ (2002: 64).  
 
In the specific relation between land and sea, commercial capitalism (Banaji, 2016) 
valorised the oceans principally as a trade route – a surface that accelerates the 
circulation of precious commodities, and channels access to distant markets. The sea 
also acted as a venue for the trade in enslaved humans. But this was never a simple or 
automatic ‘flow’ and was instead characterised by friction, resistance and uncertainty 
(Rediker, 2007). The associated delays and risk demanded the development of more 
sophisticated institutions of finance, insurance and information so central to the 
origins of commercial capitalism, and were important antecedents for contemporary 
financialisation (Baucom, 2005). Moreover, as Lauren Benton’s (2010) path-breaking 
work has illustrated, the maritime basis of commercial capitalism challenged any 
straightforward application of exclusive sovereign territoriality, creating overseas 
enclaves, corridors and brackish zones characterised by variegated, overlapping and 
plural legal geographies which in turn often influenced the organisation of 
sovereignty, territory and appropriation on land (the City of London’s continued 
operation as a tax-haven ‘city within a city’ is a good example of this).  The advent of 
industrial capitalism gave such exchange and mobility a fresh impetus as the sea itself 
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became both driver and site for the generalised production of value (ship building and 
timber and steel industries, the mass employment of seafarers with disposable 
incomes, industrial fishing and whaling, mineral extraction) and, through technologies 
like refrigeration or telegraphy, deepened the integration between the circuits of 
production, trade and credit. Moreover, facilitating these new processes of wealth-
creation and accumulation there emerged in the course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth-centuries a host of domestic, bilateral and multilateral institutions, as well 
as a body of public international and mercantile law, and conventions specifically 
aimed at regulating the global ocean. 
 
The combination of these socio-economic and political activities in and about the sea 
has generated a particularly capitalist form of terraqueousness. It is characterised by 
an attempt to harness the constant circulation of ‘value in motion’ to the need of 
investing in fixed logistical and social infrastructure that can facilitate and smoothen 
such mobility. Whereas commercial capitalism relies overwhelmingly on commodity 
circuits (‘differential accumulation’ or ‘buying cheap and selling dear’), industrial 
capitalism requires a more systematic integration of the three circuits of productive, 
commodity and money capital. The realisation of value under industrial capitalism 
thus necessitates the coordination of flows and stocks – managing the turnover time of 
capital – so that commodities can be produced, stored and distributed as well as 
exchanged and consumed (Marx, 1992; Newsome, 2010). These logistical operations 
have tremendous spatial implications, as transport geographers have amply shown 
through the years.  
 
In the popular imagination, the oceans seem to serve as the domain of commodity and 
money circuits par excellence, whereas land operates as the principal abode of 
productive capital. But this bypasses the centrality of the sea as a place where social 
relations are productive of surplus value in sectors like fishing and maritime transport 
which from the early eighteenth century represented a significant part of the capitalist 
labour force (second only to agricultural labourers and textile workers in eighteenth-
century England) (Linebaugh, 2003). Such dense interconnections between peoples 
and places across commodity chains and frontiers gave meaning to the notion that 
‘Amsterdam is standing on Norway’ (Moore, 2010). Further, technological 
transformations accompanying the industrialisation of capitalism since the mid-
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nineteenth century – from steam ships to containerisation and food canning to deep-
freezing – drastically reduced turnover time and enhanced the durability of 
internationally traded food, compressing the space and risk between points of 
production and consumption. For our purposes, the upshot of these tendencies – 
however uneven in their manifestation – is that the fluid sea and firm land cannot be 
so readily distinguished in terms of their perceived qualities. Yet at the same time, the 
irreducibly geo-physical attributes of earth and water complicate any attempt at 
simply demarcating the sea along terrestrial lines that characterise the exercise of state 
sovereignty and accumulation of capital on land. These tensions and contradictions 
convey the form of terraqueous territoriality we are seeking to explore: a distinctively 
capitalist articulation of sovereignty, territory and appropriation which tries to 
transcend the land-sea dualism though a periodic enclosure and parcelisation of the 
sea, but which constantly encounters in the geo-physical force of the ocean a 
seemingly insurmountable obstacle that often resolves itself in the creation of  
amphibious and zonal organisations of space such as the EEZ, the High Risk Zone or 
indeed the ship flying a ‘flag of convenience’. We turn now to our three illustrations 
of how capitalist states and firms mobilise and combine different conceptions and 
practices of law, politics and economics (or sovereignty, territory and accumulation) 
in an attempt at forging a terraqueous territoriality that can manage the existing world 
order. 
 
Appropriating the sea: Exclusive economic zones  
 
The EEZ is emblematic of the terraqueous territoriality we are positing in that it 
incorporates sovereignty (exclusive), appropriation (economic) and territory (zone) in 
its very title. The codification of the EEZ under UNCLOS III in 1982, after a period 
of acceptance in customary international law from the mid-1970s, was the single 
greatest enclosure in human history. EEZs cover 35 percent of the total area of the 
seas, and contain around 90 percent of the world’s fish stocks (De Fontaubert and 
Lutchman, 2003). They emerged as a terraqueous space during the postwar years, 
partly in response to capitalist innovation and development of distant-water fisheries 
and offshore resource extraction, but mainly as a result of Cold War geopolitical 
considerations, including the Third Worldist campaign for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO). The outcome was a distinctive legal framework allowing 
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coastal states to claim special sovereign rights (but not territorial sovereignty) over a 
given EEZ.  
 
The sophisticated separation of the political (sovereign powers) from the economic 
(property rights) enshrined in the EEZ regime neatly reflects a capitalist logic where 
the sea is functionally exploited as a resource, rather than politically occupied as a 
territory. In a 1971 White House exchange between President Nixon and Secretary of 
State Kissinger over a fisheries dispute with Brazil, the US President is reported to 
have asserted: ‘Navigation we want. Let them fish if they want’ (Kraska, 2011: 140). 
The implication being (more or less sustained by the USA and other powers since 
then) that so long as the principles of freedom of navigation and innocent passage for 
the world’s largest fleets are upheld, coastal states can do with their marine resources 
as they please. But this stands only as long as these resources remain faithfully 
fenced-in by the lines in the sea drawn by the capitalist state system. ‘Highly-
migratory’ species transcend these borders and made a muddle of Nixon’s distinction. 
The wide geographical flow of tuna species led to their categorisation as a ‘highly 
migratory species’ under UNCLOS III: ‘stocks or stocks of associated species 
occurring both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and 
adjacent to the zone’ (UNCLOS 1982, Part V, Art. 63, see also Art. 64). Therefore, 
while there is some empirical truth in the category of ‘highly migratory’, it is more of 
a politico-legal distinction rather than a biological one because of the definitional 
centrality of the territorial boundary of EEZs. As tuna straddle a range of international 
legal boundaries the biomass cannot be unilaterally controlled by a single state in the 
system of (legally) equal states: as such, highly migratory species like tuna can only 
be nobodies’ property. The US instead relied on its geo-economic leverage to muscle 
its way into fishing grounds on behalf of the US tuna industry, which was a politically 
powerful player, punching well above its economic weight (Campling et al., 2007). 
But coastal states resisted. In 1984, the Solomon Islands state enforced its sovereign 
rights – landed-property – and arrested and confiscated US tuna boats fishing in its 
EEZ. The US response was to compensate boat owners and deduct the costs from 
Overseas Development Assistance previously committed to the Solomon Islands (Van 
Dyke and Nicol, 1987). Kiribati upped the ante in 1985 when it signed a deal with the 
Soviet Union over access to tuna in its EEZ (Teiwaki, 1987), which would have given 
the USSR a strategic foothold in the Western Central Pacific Ocean – a sphere of US 
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influence. The US acquiesced and negotiated what for many years was seen as the 
world’s most stable and lucrative tuna access agreement with all 14 independent 
Pacific Island countries, albeit continuing to refuse to sign-up to UNCLOS III.  
 
As we’ll shortly see, neutral, functionalist conceptions of the law of the sea generally, 
and the EEZ in particular mask the socio-economic contestation and (geo)political 
power dynamics that underpin this legal-property regime. The socio-spatial form of 
the EEZ also challenges a common view of the global ocean as a lawless frontier. 
Popular books such as William Langewiesche’s The Outlaw Sea (2005) or John 
Urry’s (2014) Offshoring present the sea as a place where the state ceases to be. But 
in international law at least, the sea is spliced into multiple jurisdictions: states enjoy 
sovereign rights to marine resources in the EEZ as just noted; the High Seas are 
‘nobodies property’ (i.e. not a ‘commons’); while the seabed – the Area – is the 
‘common heritage of [hu]mankind’, among other jurisdictions.2 While there is debate 
on the interpretation of this latter notion (Hannigan, 2015, pages 65-69), the creation 
of the International Seabed Authority in 2011 to regulate access to deep-sea mining is 
an important hurdle to sovereign claims and private appropriation. Even in the least 
constituted of these jurisdictions – the High Seas – fishing activities are governed by 
complex layers of international law (if not enforcement capacity in practice), 
including regional fisheries management organisations’ partial regulatory reach over 
fish stocks, the International Maritime Organisation’s authority over shipping 
pollution, and the International Labour Organisation’s over the pay, working 
conditions, and occupational health and safety of crew on boats.   
 
There are, then, plenty of examples of how diverse global governance regimes and 
institutions seek to manage the global ocean in its surface, deepwater and sub-sea 
totality. The difficulty for many of these multilateral agencies lies in conjugating the 
liberal principle of the ‘freedom of the seas’ with the drive to secure sovereign 
property rights over, and the capture of ground-rent through these resources. The EEZ 
represents one such attempt at marrying unfettered mobility and legal appropriation, 
albeit with the sea in this instance serving as a laboratory in the experimentation with 
forms of overlapping governance that have subsequently been applied on land (Haas, 
                                                 
2
 The list also includes the 12 nautical mile territorial seas, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf 
and archipelagic waters. 
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1990). In this regard, it is helpful to understand the EEZ not just as an area or zone but 
also, as Gavin Bridge has suggested, to consider it in volumetric terms ‘as a spatial 
form of property through which the circulation of resources and commodities is 
controlled’ (Bridge, 2013: 57). In contrast to a static, purely grounded conception of 
resources as ‘fixed territory’, Bridge enjoins us to think of ‘quanta-based’ rights to 
fish, water or other biomass as the principal way that capital can ‘secure flow’ (page 
57). On our reading, the EEZ represents exactly one such spatial form, born from the 
desire to reconcile the private appropriation of nature under and through the sea, with 
the reinforcement of the public authority of state sovereignty on land. 
 
The particular form of property rights that states have over fisheries production is a 
good instance of this confluence. The differentiation in types and degrees of surplus 
appropriation produced in fisheries systems depend, first and foremost, upon politics. 
Distributional struggles can take place at different points in the commodity chain, 
including: on boats – between boat owners and crew over profit and wages 
respectively (Howard, 2012); in the capture of ground rent from fishing firms by 
coastal states or ‘communities’ (de Alessi, 2012); via state revenue from the taxation 
of fishing and processing firms and their workers (Havice and Reed, 2012); and/or the 
provision of fisheries subsidies by ‘home’ and/or ‘host’ states (Campling and Havice, 
2013). Some of these antagonisms (and compromises) revolve around turn-over time, 
such as maximising the number of ‘fishing days’ spent appropriating nature over 
‘steaming days’ spent both travelling to and from the fishery and landing the catch 
onshore (Campling, 2012). This is a prime example of how the terraqueous conditions 
accumulation strategies. Straightforward geographical considerations like land 
location shape patterns of surplus appropriation in fisheries, with Port Victoria, 
Seychelles for instance acting as the epicentre of the Western Indian Ocean tuna 
industry because of its proximity to the major points in the annual tuna migratory 
cycle for that region.   
 
In all these cases, the politics that unfolds between, across and within states is 
compromised by inescapable natural factors that affect global fisheries. The 
abundance of nutrients and biodiversity in coastal areas is one such factor, accounting 
for the concentration of fish stocks within the limits of EEZs. The reproduction cycles 
of fish further complicate attempts at capturing this resource through static, terrestrial 
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mechanisms of control. Thus as Longo and Clark (2012) have demonstrated, 
experiments in bluefin tuna ranching –  growing the fish in fattening pens to enable a 
more efficient management of the production and marketing process – are fraught 
with ecological contradictions including the decline in rates of reproduction under 
captivity and the sharp rise in calorific requirements of ranched tuna.  
 
This complex interaction between natural and social forces is reduced by institutions 
like the World Bank that manage ocean exploitation to a seemingly disinterested, 
managerial and economising logic, turning the governance of natural resources in the 
oceans into a de-politicised, technical fix. The Bank (2009) argues that the 
institutionalisation of property rights in the sea will save annually USD50 billion in 
lost ‘wealth’. But it idealizes capitalist relations of accumulation and property in the 
sea. It assumes that optimal bio-economic conditions can be realised where property 
rights are managed so that ‘biomass (the fish stock) and the capital stock (fleet) are in 
equilibrium’ (2009: 40). Here, the Bank is taking what (it thinks) it has learned on the 
land and applying it to the sea. In doing so, it ignores the politics of property relations. 
Marx’s critique of classical political economy (especially of Ricardo) makes clear that 
ground-rent is a re-distributive portion of wealth (the surplus value produced in 
fishing activities) rather than a ‘thing’ or a techno-managerial issue that can be 
identified and ‘solved’ through policy. Like on land, oceanic property is contested, 
but under the novel spatial-juridical form of the EEZ the sea and its agents (human 
and non-human alike) do not conform to the ‘jural forms’ dominant on land (Bear, 
2012).     
 
Similar functional idealisations of the EEZ as another sovereign space of purely 
technical, ‘frictionless’ accumulation are discernible in the extraction of resources 
under the seabed. In contrast to fisheries, the challenge for the capitalist valorisation 
of offshore energy and minerals is not so much one of mobility across jurisdictions, 
but rather the articulation of land and sea within a given coastal state’s sovereignty. 
The EEZ offers coastal states a legal framework to nationalise the rent accrued from 
offshore fossil fuel and mineral extraction, as well as bio-prospecting, much in the 
same way that states own the subsoil resources within their sovereign territory on 
land. To that extent, the EEZ does in effect act as maritime prolongation of the coastal 
state’s landed property. Yet the combination of geo-physical constraints and limits to 
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territorial sovereignty we have been exploring also pose unique challenges and 
opportunities for resource extraction at sea. The technical and operational complexity 
involved in prospecting and exploiting offshore oil and gas places high barriers to 
entry which only powerful states (through National Oil Companies) and multinational 
corporations can afford to meet. Thus relative newcomers to offshore hyrdocarbons 
like Ghana and Equatorial Guinea rely overwhelmingly on foreign companies to 
deliver the costly infrastructure required for exploring, drilling, extracting and 
transporting deepwater crude and gas. The resource flows at sea are replicated in the 
mobility of both maritime installations (in the shape of mobile deepwater drill rigs, 
and floating production storage and offloading vessels, FPSOs) as well as in the 
rotating multinational workforce. ‘The result’, Brenda Chalfin (2015: 104) suggests 
speaking of the western Gulf of Guinea, ‘is an oil complex sustained by onshore 
goods and services yet fundamentally rooted in ocean space’. However, these 
formidable logistical and engineering feats – ‘saturation’ diving capsules which allow 
pipeline and rig repair and maintenance at 1,000 feet below sea level, or airlifting of 
personnel onto FPSOs (Rich, 2013) – also offer the possibility of displacing the social 
and environmental costs attached to such processes by literally expelling them out to 
sea. In her rich ethnographic account of offshore oil work in Equatorial Guinea, 
Hannah Appel (2012) captures the utopian aspiration of ‘frictionless profit’ among 
Equatoguinean government officials who conceive of offshore as a secure, apolitical 
space: ‘off the shores of political entanglements, community entitlement, discernable 
forms of pollution in inhabited areas, or militant attacks and bunkering focused on 
accessible pipelines’ (page 698).  
 
Allied to the legislative hyperactivity that surrounds foreign investment in offshore 
energy – including laws seeking to ensure ‘local content’ and ‘local participation’ in 
the new extractive ventures – as well as NGO involvement through corporate social 
responsibility projects, it is clear that these transactions, far from being purely 
technical and economic, are deeply enmeshed in political power relations (Chalfin, 
2015: 113). Rethinking the rent-capture inherent in such activities as part of a broader 
set of struggles over surplus thus introduces a more complex understanding of the 
socio-natural relations at stake in EEZs. It forces us to reflect on the EEZ as a 
sovereign mechanism for extracting ground-rent, where the coastal state assumes the 
‘class function’ of modern landed property because, as with private property over 
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landed-resources, access rights to fish, or exploration and extractive concessions are 
‘separated from capital: it is merely the jural form and social location of ownership 
that has changed’ (Capps, 2012: 318). Furthermore, re-conceptualising the sovereign 
rights encapsulated in EEZ’s as a legal basis for the capture of ground-rent once again 
underscores the peculiarly terraqueous territoriality at play here: not only is the 
exploitation of marine resources reliant on land-side infrastructure and property 
regimes (that much is fairly obvious), but the forms of surplus appropriation adopted 
by land-based sovereign states and capitalist firms are strongly conditioned by the 
socio-natural cycles and forces at sea.  
 
Mobile Sovereignty: The flag of convenience ship 
 
By 2014, the owners of well over 70 percent by deadweight tonnage of the world fleet 
chose to use flags other than their own, many of which are considered flags of 
convenience (FOC) (UNCTAD 2014: 55). To tell the history of the open vessel 
registry is to trace an incremental but very deliberate series of capitalist strategies to 
avoid business tax and to bypass years of seafarers’ struggle to institutionalise decent 
pay and working conditions. The legal innovation of the modern FOC originated in 
Panama. Designed to short-circuit US law on workers’ rights and prohibition, Panama 
gave legal and illicit US enterprises the ability to register vessels under its flag in 
return for a small fee. ‘Flagging out’ was ratcheted up during the global stagflation of 
the 1970s and the frantic hunt for improved profitability among boat-owners (Walters 
and Bailey, 2013). Fiscally squeezed post-colonial countries such as Liberia, Republic 
of the Marshall Islands and the Bahamas joined Panama as leading FOC states. In 
using their newfound sovereignty as a going concern, these governments capture rents 
from vessel registration powers as a form of state-property. 
 
When sociologist John Urry (2014: 161) typifies FOC ships as ‘a neo-liberal paradise’ 
he is presenting only a half-truth. First of all, it is a misconception to suggest there is 
no regulation in the shipping industry – as we shall see, FOC ships remain subject to 
(inter-)state regulation and political contestation, including that initiated by trade 
unions. Second, and moreover, such emphasis on offshoring as a facilitator of ‘“post-
national” systems of contemporary mobility’ underplays the fundamental role of state 
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power in authoring globalisation through practices and policies of reregulation
3
 
(Panitch and Gindin, 2012, page 9). We deal only with the first of these directly here, 
but in doing so pick up on some reinforcement of the second claim. As with the EEZ, 
the relationship between sovereignty, territory and appropriation for FOC boats is full 
of nuance and complexity. 
 
Drawing on ideas in Barkan’s Corporate Sovereignty (2013), it is helpful to 
conceptualise FOC vessels as terraqueous territories in two senses: as sovereign 
spaces and as a strategy of accumulation. First, when a sovereign is outside its 
territorial limits and meets another sovereign, the potential conflict of laws that ensues 
is mediated by the concept of comity, wherein deference or courtesy is show between 
sovereigns. While sovereignty is normally associated with an exclusive territory, 
comity provides a way for sovereigns to interact in shared space and settle disputes 
‘over the application of territorial laws in an international context’ (Barkan, 2013, 
page 89)
 
such as the high seas. In this way, the law of the flag state establishes borders 
and territorialises space on board the boat even when steaming through another state’s 
sovereign waters. ‘The story of comity’ Barkan suggests, ‘explains how companies 
[including shipping firms] carved out legal autonomy by inhabiting the negative 
spaces of the international state system’ (Barkan, 2013, page 108). Here the particular 
relation between land and sea becomes sharply apparent, as legal principles like 
comity stitch together sovereignty, territory and appropriation in a global ocean 
otherwise deemed to be lawless and unruly. And it is perhaps this relation that leads 
Steinberg (2009, page 467) to argue that ‘[m]ovement, beyond and across, as well as 
within a bounded territory, serves to reproduce the territory that is being bounded’. 
Even when falling under another state’s ‘static’ domain of sovereign rights in an EEZ, 
the principle of comity means that the boat owner/captain are subject principally to 
the regulations of the flag state (at least in regard to labour standards on the boat).  
 
Second, given that a characteristic of the open registry is the ability of shipowners to 
‘buy’ a sovereign and thus the legal jurisdiction that regulates their activities, 
shipowners produce territory as an accumulation strategy. Shipowners use 
sovereignty invested in state jurisdiction to cut crew costs and undermine the self-
                                                 
3
 At sea this is often manifest in the almost farcical cases of home governments subsidising FOC ships 
that are trying to avoid government quotas and/or regulations (De Sombre and Barkin, 2011: 69). 
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organisation of labour, as well minimising tax bills and avoiding agreements on 
fishing quotas.
 
Fishers and seafarers started and ended the twentieth century working 
in the world’s most dangerous jobs (Walters and Bailey 2013). Both fall easily 
between the cracks of regulatory jurisdiction: flag state, port state, vessel owner, crew 
agency, national waters, high seas. Given the jurisdictional complexity of maritime 
labour regimes it is no surprise that they are among the first examples of international 
labour regulation, and have more occupation-specific regulation at the International 
Labour Organisation than for any other job (Couper et al., 1999). It is impossible to 
avoid the rich irony accompanying a system of ‘open’ registers camouflaging some of 
the world economy’s worst working practices and most opaque ownership and 
taxation structures; the FOC regime underwrites all the surface speed, flexibility and 
mobility privileged by capital whilst condemning those who work and live in the 
ship’s lower quarters to confinement, regimentation and domination. As Leon Fink 
puts it in his book Sweatshops at Sea, for workers the FOC regime is ‘a stunningly 
unique economic phenomenon. In one sweep of a pen …an entire ship’s labour force 
could be transferred overnight to the jurisdiction and sovereignty of a new national 
“master”’ (Fink, 2014: 178). While Elizabeth De Sombre’s study of the application of 
international regulation to FOC vessels found a ‘race to the middle’ in terms of 
environmental and safety standards, this was less the case for labour standards (De 
Sombre, 2006: 260-63). To take the example of work on fishing boats that is 
symptomatic of open registries: reliable data on deaths and injuries do not exist 
because most countries fail to systematically report them (Couper et al. 1999; Walters 
and Bailey, 2013). In contrast to factories and fields, fishing circumscribes physically 
the labour process to floating platforms of production that can transcend jurisdictions 
in various ways (e.g. legally through FOC and/ or geographically following the fish 
between EEZs and the legal grey zone of the high seas). The ship in this regard 
becomes what Jonathan Bach (via Bruno Latour) calls an 'immutable mobile' (2011) – 
an object that moves through space without thereby losing its property as a site of 
production. This makes one of the world’s most dangerous jobs also among the most 
weakly regulated, both in policy and practice.
4
 While the close working environment 
of a fishing boat can spur solidarity among crew, this is often countered by boat 
owners pitting different nationalities of crew against each other such as on board the 
                                                 
4
 For example, fishing crew were explicitly excluded from the 2006 ILO Maritime Labour Convention, 
Article II (4).  
16 
 
boats of the EU tuna fleet in the Western Indian Ocean where French able-bodied 
crew receive a basic salary (e.g. without catch share) of €1,100 per month while 
Malagasy and Seychellois crew receive only €207 and basic pay for Senegalese crew 
is reportedly somewhere in-between the two.
5
 Restriction to a space that is only ever 
contiguous with other jurisdictions and workers while on-shore, limits the 
organisational power of labour, despite the crew’s spatial proximity – even though 
this in turn creates difficulties for management of labour control such as different 
languages and cultures of work onboard. 
 
Despite these constraints, it is organised labour, not states, that has part-blocked the 
anti-labour tide of open registries. The FOC is not an automatic or smooth strategy for 
capitalist accumulation. It is contested by considerable sources of countervailing 
power, such as the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) FOC campaign. 
For example, the proportion of FOC ships with ITF agreements grew from less than 8 
percent in 1990 to over 30 percent in 2000 (Lillie, 2005; Fink, 2014). Notwithstanding 
this impressive gain, it must be remembered that ITF agreements are only with 
particular flags and for specific periods (2000 was a particularly ‘good year’); that 
secondary action (i.e. port worker solidarity with FOC crew) is only legal in very few 
places now; and, related, that ‘traditional’ dock workers’ unions – the ITF’s 
‘industrial muscle’ – are on the decline in many places.6  
 
The flags of sovereign states produce a mobile border onboard, which in turn 
reproduces distinctive terraqueous territorialities on land. The motley crews on 
contemporary FOC vessels form part of a much longer history of mobile hierarchies 
on ships, leading to all sorts of contradictory spatial forms onshore: from the polyglot 
and multi-ethnic neighbourhoods of port towns to the legal challenges posed by the 
status of foreign seafarers resident in metropolitan lands. The dialectic of circulation 
and accumulation so intrinsic to the history of capitalism and the sea has been 
accompanied by conflicting spatial phenomena such as the pioneering role of 
seafarers and dockworkers in working-class internationalism on the one hand 
(Linebaugh, 2003; Featherstone, 2015), and the most rigid racial segregation and 
                                                 
5
 Personal communications, multiple representatives of EU fleets and crew, Madagascar (December 
2013) and Seychelles (January 2014). 
6
 Personal communication, ITF representative December 2014. 
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domination of maritime workers reflected in the distribution of space and rights both 
aboard and ashore on the other (Balachandran, 2012). Like their so-called ‘lascar’ 
predecessors, Filipino, Burmese, Cambodian or Bangladeshi seafarers today occupy 
the lower rungs of the industry, working under murky terms and conditions facilitated 
by the FOC regime, and driven to sea by prospects of repatriating remittances to their 
grossly unequal homelands. As in other sectors highly reliant on migrant labour, the 
shipping and fishing industries exploit the flexible, low cost but highly-controlled 
labour process afforded by the open registry system. Yet the difference is that, at sea, 
it is the floating capital that is in constant movement; labour remains relatively static 
within the factory ship, and the possibilities of shore leave are highly restricted. In 
extreme, though hardly rare cases, seafarers are in effect imprisoned for years on 
ships, acting as bonded and even slave labour tied by land-side debts and obligations 
to shipowners and operators (McDowell et al., 2015). The integrated network of legal-
bureaucratic and market power sustaining the open registry regime from land thus 
contrasts – and has a corollary – in the isolation, precariousness and vulnerability of 
fishers and seafarers working on FOC ships at sea. These uniquely terraqueous 
organisations of space deliver distinctive geographies of labour exploitation, identity 
and solidarity.      
 
In sum, the ‘open registry’ regime illustrates how fishing vessels in particular are 
never far off land when they’re at sea: they carry with them all of the characteristics 
of a land-based labour process associated to say, mining – ethnic segmentation of the 
workforce, strict labour discipline, repetitive tasks, combination of workplace and 
lifeworld in a single confined space. Similarly, the open registry ship carries the 
jurisdiction of its purchased sovereignty in the FOC. Yet, while on the high seas, the 
ship is also a space within a space, moving the economic activity within its hull across 
a limitless surface. Workers producing value within and across these spaces, on the 
other hand, are subject to an altogether narrower territoriality – one defined by the 
contained, restricted and deeply hierarchical workplace that is the factory ship.  
 
New territorialities of Ocean Governance: Counter-piracy 
 
At first sight, the choice of piracy as an illustration of capitalist territoriality at sea 
might appear perverse. Piracy – and its legitimate sibling, privateering – are after all 
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phenomena chiefly associated to non-capitalist, mercantilist empires. Despite its 
concentrated occurrence today in hotspots off western Africa, the Malacca Straits, 
Celebes and Sulu Seas and, since the 2000s, the north and western Indian Ocean, 
piracy remains a relatively marginal practice in global politics. Yet the incidence of 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden and its environs has in the past couple of decades 
occasioned much geopolitical anxiety, and produced multilateral counter-piracy 
initiatives which are noteworthy in understanding the terraqueous territoriality of 
capitalism today. 
    
Contemporary piracy is significant chiefly because it challenges the capitalist world 
order in at least three kinds of ways (Glück, 2015). First, it can block access through 
some of the key maritime chokepoints in the global economy – most obviously the 
Suez Canal and the Malacca Straits. As we have seen, oceanic sea-lanes continue to 
act as the main conduits for non-bulk international trade, and delays in the transit of 
goods can cost firms very dearly at all stages of the commodity chain (Bensassi and 
Martínez-Zarzoso, 2012). Second, maritime piracy presses on an Achilles’ heel of the 
capitalist world order, namely the ambiguous jurisdiction on the high seas. On the one 
hand, piracy is clearly an outlawed practice in public international law, yet on the 
other hand, even the most powerful states – America, China, EU members and Russia 
– constantly run into juridical complications in combating maritime piracy. 
Washington and other western capitals have signed bilateral conventions with Kenya 
and Seychelles to avoid processing alleged pirates through their own domestic laws, 
instead outsourcing the task to courts in Mombasa, while China and Russia have been 
forced to deploy counter-piracy forces in the western Indian Ocean in defence of their 
own cargo fleets. Contemporary piracy has thus turned parts of the ocean-space into a 
laboratory for new multilateral forms of governance and force that are largely absent 
on land (Dua, 2015). Finally, the experience of Somali piracy in particular has driven 
home the point that the high seas and unpoliced EEZs act as the dumpsite (both 
literally and figuratively) of land-side crises and pathologies – be they so-called 
collapsed states or the illegal disposal of toxic waste (Schneider and Winkler, 2013). 
The ocean-world appears in these cases as the space of exception, where the laws and 
powers of the sovereign state are seemingly suspended in order to address the peculiar 
challenges of sea-borne violence and illegal practices. To that extent, the sea presents 
itself to the dominant powers as a disorderly geopolitical sphere in dire need of 
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regulation, policing and management so that the uninterrupted and unimpeded flow of 
commodities across the planet can be guaranteed. Let us briefly consider each of these 
three challenges by way of specifying how the relationship between contemporary 
piracy and global capitalism has forged distinctive expressions of a terraqueous 
territoriality. 
 
In August 2011, a group of maritime industry organisations, including the 
International Chamber of Shipping as well as the ITF, issued the fourth version of 
guidelines entitled ‘Best Management Practices for Protection Against Somalia Based 
Piracy’ (BMP4).7 The document produces an explicit territorialisation of a High Risk 
Area in the Gulf of Aden defined as ‘an area bounded by Suez and the Strait of 
Hormuz to the North, 10°S and 78°E’.8 This particular area is one of several zones in 
the north and western Indian Ocean (the Internationally Recommended Transit 
Corridor – IRTC – and the Extended Risk Area are two others mapped in Figure 1) 
that have over the past decade or so been delimited, monitored and patrolled by a 
combination of diverse state and private organisations – from the UK Maritime 
Operations (UKMO) office in Dubai, to the Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa 
(MSCHOA), ‘an initiative established by EU NAVFOR with close co-operation from 
industry’ (EU NAVFOR, 2016). Such exercises have adopted some of the core 
characteristics of transnational governance – multilateralism, ‘hybrid’ (military-
civilian) mandates and public-private partnerships. The UN’s 2008 Security Council 
Resolution 1816, the first of several such resolutions on Somali piracy, occasioned the 
establishment of the EU NAVFOR (initially Operation ATALANTA, and from 2009 
complemented by NATO’s ‘Operation Ocean Shield’ and Combined Task Force-
151), ostensibly to protect World Food Programme (WFP) and African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) vessels from piratical attacks both in Somali and 
international waters. This humanitarian mandate was, however, from the beginning 
informed by a wider commercial concern, clearly (if somewhat surreptitiously) stated 
in the IMO’s Resolution A1002 adopted in November 2007, which called on the UN 
to recognise ‘the strategic importance of the navigational routes along the coast of 
Somalia for regional and global seaborne trade and the need to ensure that they 
                                                 
7
 Available, inter alia, on the NATO Shipping Centre website: 
http://www.shipping.nato.int/Pages/BMP.aspx 
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remain safe at all times’ (IMO, 2017). There is therefore no mystery to the motivation 
behind this (re)territorialisation of the north and western Indian Ocean: as the reach of 
the Extended Risk Zone indicates, even if its origins lie in the WFP and AMISOM 
humanitarian effort in Somalia, counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden has plainly 
become a policing and governance exercise aimed at securing the maritime circulation 
of commodity capital through that strategic region.   
 
Figure 1: International Bargaining Forum Map of Warlike and Risk Areas and 
Zones, as of July 2014  
[FIGURE 1 HERE PLEASE] 
 
 
Much of this is uncontroversial, but the distinctive terraqueousness of these counter-
piracy initiatives is perhaps less obvious. For a start, because most piratical attacks 
take place outside of territorial waters it is almost impossible to patrol the whole 
extent of the designated risk areas. Instead the latter are monitored, controlled and 
supported from strategic coastal bases and offices in Djibouti, Dubai or Seychelles 
(the operational HQ of MSCHOA is further inland, in Northwood, Herefordshire!). 
The contemporary attempt at policing the flowing sea from fixed land thus generates 
new imperial geographies as counter-piracy campaigns re-colonise older imperial 
outposts and recharge these locations with the mission of rendering the unruly seas 
stable and secure. Moreover, for all their high-tech attempts at delimiting the sea as 
authorities try to do on land, the distinctive geo-physical features of the ocean remain 
stubbornly resistant to governance regimes seeking to guarantee a 24/7, 365-days a 
year passage through the perilous waters of the Gulf of Aden. Transit through the 
IRTC is statistically safest at night-time, while the BMP4 itself recognises that 
seasonal weather conditions can significantly affect the patterns of pirate activity.
9
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the efforts at territorialising sections of the 
ocean through counter-piracy regimes create new valorisations of risk that bind land 
and sea in peculiar ways. The incidence of piracy increases the risk and therefore the 
costs – labour, insurance, fuel – of transit across the Gulf of Aden. The mapping of 
                                                 
9
 ‘Pirate activity generally reduces in areas affected by the South West monsoon, and increases in the 
period following the monsoon. The onset of the North East monsoon generally has a lesser effect on 
piracy activity than the South West monsoon’. (BMP4, 2011: 3). 
21 
 
High Risk Areas has direct implications for the terms and conditions of seafarers 
working on vessels in those areas. The International Bargaining Forum (IBF), the 
union-employer negotiating body for the maritime industry, has agreed to a series of 
bonuses, compensation packages and rights to refuse sailing within those designated 
areas. Similarly, on some calculations, the excess costs of insurance premiums 
resulting from Lloyds Market Association declaring the Gulf of Aden a ‘War Risk 
Area’ in 2008 amount to anything between US$ 460 million to US$ 3.2 billion a year 
(One Earth Future, 2012).  
 
None of these phenomena – remote control and command, the ‘friction’ of weather 
patterns, the increased premiums in high risk zones – are necessarily unique to the 
high seas. But they are distinctive as the scale and fluidity of the global ocean 
precludes the traditional terrestrial response to such predicament: occupation through 
settlement. Multilateral governance initiatives like those off the coast of Somalia that 
try to make the sea safe for commodity circulation, have to battle with the challenge 
of enforcing the monopoly over the means of violence within designated high risk 
areas that are in constant motion. The attempts at transcending the sea-land divide 
through the delimitation and pacification of maritime zones in fact generate new 
spatial configurations which in many respects reinforce that very duality (whilst 
acknowledging their interconnection): counter-piracy takes on a multilateral character 
at sea, but regional states and their onshore coastal facilities acquire a critical 
geopolitical role; the supposedly free seas become increasingly regulated and 
enforced from land by regimes of risk such as insurance premiums, special 
employment terms and conditions, or corporate security-proofing.  
 
In the past few decades, states and capital interests have struggled to give greater 
definition to this legal ambiguity through the (re)regulation of maritime space. In the 
case of contemporary piracy, as we have seen, a combination of multilateral counter-
piracy initiatives and the invocation of universal jurisdiction has resulted in attempts 
at territorialising the sea, thereby securing safe and uninterrupted passage of 
commercial traffic through the Gulf of Aden. The experiments in global governance 
have however come across geo-physical obstacles in the flowing sea and in forms of 
land-based territoriality (essentially sovereign control), which create distinctive 
problems for those seeking to police the seas – most obviously, how to process 
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suspected pirates captured in the high seas. The result has in most cases been a 
reconfiguration of the relationship between sovereignty, territory and appropriation 
that renders piratical waters off the coast of Somalia as a terraqueous zone: both 
delimited and patrolled, yet also associated to high risk and lawlessness. Responses to 
contemporary piracy, then, illustrate the tensions and contradictions in creating a 
world order that (in Carl Schmitt’s sense) aligns order and orientation by securing the 





The sea is both a crucial site for the valorisation of capital – be it through extraction 
or transport – and a major bio-physical obstacle to its reproduction. It is 
simultaneously a natural resource and an arena of contested social relations; a realm 
of movement and freedom which nonetheless has been host to the most sophisticated 
regimes of hierarchical captivity – be these slaving vessels of the past or today’s 
factory fishing ships. We have explored these tensions between capitalism and the sea 
through the prism of the terrestrial-maritime divide, suggesting that the distinctive 
features of capitalism as a mode of production constantly seek to transcend the land-
sea binary, thereby producing new configurations of space which we have analysed 
under the label of terraqueous territoriality. Although diverse human societies have 
through time engaged in different conceptions and practices of terraqueous 
territoriality, it is the advent of industrial capitalism which has in our view intensified 
the relationship between land and sea, attempting in the process to ‘flatten’ the geo-
physical division between solid ground and fluid water. 
 
Carl Schmitt (2003) claimed that world orders are sustained by the convergence of 
order and orientation in a sequence of political occupation, legal delimitation and 
economic appropriation. We have given this schema a Marxist twist by focusing 
instead on the interaction between sovereignty, territory and appropriation in the 
global ocean. By exploring the (re)configuration of these three domains of power in 
the practices of EEZs, open registers and counter-piracy we have sought to 
demonstrate how capital’s encounter with the sea generates all kinds of complex, 
contradictory and often conflictual attempts at resolving the inherent tension between 
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a mode of production reliant on commodity circulation, yet also radically dependent 
on fixed social and technical infrastructure for its own reproduction. More concretely, 
this tension manifests itself in the multi-layered territorialisation of the ocean through 
the EEZ, which facilitates the appropriation of marine resources via state-landed 
property whilst also turning these waters and their resources into a class-antagonistic 
domain of wealth distribution. Similarly, the open registry ship exemplifies how the 
competitive imperatives of the capitalist market at sea led to the invention of a ‘legal 
fiction’ of the FOC as a mechanism exploiting the vessel’s ‘immutable mobility’ in an 
ocean-space whose vast geophysical and jurisdictionally open properties facilitate 
poor or weak regulation of ships as sites of commodity production. Finally, we also 
considered the experience of contemporary counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden as yet 
another instance where the critical role of the high seas as a surface of commodity 
circulation is compromised by the threat of blockages, inflated risk and an ambiguous 
jurisdiction over alleged pirates. As in the case of the ocean enclosures, counter-
piracy has yielded new regimes of multilateral governance and control of the high 
seas aimed fundamentally at securing the existing world order. 
 
For all their differences, all these cases indicate the various ways in which the relation 
between capitalism and the sea creates distinctive spatial and juridical forms aimed at 
reconciling the production, appropriation and distribution of value in our terraqueous 
world. These are always political in the sense that they involve disputes over power 
(even when agreement is reached) – be they among states, between capital and labour, 
firms and campaign groups, or a combination of all these. But these political 
antagonisms over wealth and power, we have argued, acquire a specific character 
when land meets sea. They are conditioned by the particular interaction between 
natural forces of the global ocean (its movements, currents, weather-patterns and 
geographical features) and the social forms typical of industrial capitalism (the 
integration of the circuit of capital). The terraqueous character of their relationship is 
both cause and effect of capital’s distinctive organisation of sovereignty, territory and 
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